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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mark Whitman appeals from his conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance and resisting or obstructing officers. Whitman challenges the denial of 
his suppression motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
While on patrol, Idaho State Police Trooper Bailey observed a suburban 
pulling a pickup bed without a license plate. (7/20/09 Tr., p.18, L.18- p.19, L.5.) 
He made eye contact with the driver of the suburban who "immediately in a quick 
furtive movement looked away." (7/20/09 Tr., p.20, Ls.5-8.) Trooper Bailey 
resumed his patrol on the interstate and was soon passed by the same vehicle 
when he noticed the pickup bed trailer was lacking working taillights in addition to 
not having a license plate. (7 /20/09 Tr., p.20, Ls.11-23.) Trooper Bailey pulled 
the vehicle over and identified Whitman as the driver. (7/20/09 Tr., p.21, Ls.3-
25.) Whitman had not been the driver of the vehicle when the trooper first 
observed the suburban at the gas station (7/20/09 Tr., p.27, Ls.4-14) but when 
asked, Whitman denied there were any other people in the vehicle (7/20/09 Tr., 
p.22, Ls.3-8). 
While speaking to the trooper, Whitman was "hesitant as though he was 
pausing perhaps thinking before answering [the trooper's] questions." (7/20/09 
Tr., p.22, Ls.18-20.) Trooper Bailey saw a bullet in the middle console but 
Whitman denied there were any firearms in the vehicle. (7/20/09 Tr., p.22, Ls.8-
1 
11.) The trooper noticed the rear passenger window was rolled down which he 
found odd because it was cold and 6:30 in the morning. (7/20/09 Tr., p.22, L.23 
- p.23, L.3.) Trooper Bailey then saw a stack of blankets piled over the top of the 
rear seats which were laying down. (7/20/09 Tr., p.23, Ls.4-5.) On further 
inspection, Trooper Bailey noticed brown hair sticking out from the pile of 
blankets. (7/20/09 Tr., p.23, Ls.17-19.) The hair belonged to Michael Maddox, 
the individual who was driving the suburban when it was first observed by the 
trooper. (7/20/09 Tr., p.23, L.20 - p.24, L.7; p.27, Ls.4-14.) Whitman expressed 
surprise to see Maddox. (7/20/09 Tr., p.24, Ls.10-12.) 
It was determined that Maddox had multiple confirmed warrants with 
"caution codes listed." (7/20/09 Tr., p.25, Ls.20-22.) Maddox and Whitman were 
taken out of the vehicle and secured in police cars before Whitman's vehicle was 
searched. (7/20/09 Tr., p.27, L.17 - p.29, L.19 (testimony by Trooper Bailey that 
Maddox was taken into custody at gun point, handcuffed, searched incident to 
arrest, and placed in the back of a patrol car while Whitman was patted down for 
weapons, detained, and placed in the back of a patrol vehicle).) During the 
search of Whitman's vehicle, the officers found a briefcase containing the title to 
the suburban identifying Whitman as the owner, a loaded handgun which had 
been reported stolen, "a clear white plastic bag with white crystal substance 
residue inside," and a scale in addition to two more handguns under the rear seat 
where Maddox had been hiding. (7/20/09 Tr., p.32, L.4 - p.33, L.1; PSI p.2.) 
The state charged Whitman with aiding and abetting grand theft by 
receiving or possessing stolen property for the handgun located in the briefcase, 
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possession of a controlled substance, resisting or obstructing officers, and 
possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp.17-19.) Whitman filed a motion to suppress 
asserting that any evidence seized pursuant to a search incident to arrest must 
be suppressed pursuant to Gant.1 (R., p. 24.) 
After a hearing on the motion to suppress followed by supplemental 
briefing by the parties, the district court denied Whitman's motion to suppress. 
(R., pp.94-106.) Whitman entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Rule 11 to 
the charges of possession of a controlled substance and resisting or obstructing 
officers, reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., 
pp.112-114; 1/04/10 Tr., p.8, L.8 - p.21, L.14) The court sentenced Whitman to 
a period of seven years, with the first three years fixed, for possession of a 
controlled substance and one year in jail for the resisting or obstructing; these 
sentences were suspended and the court placed Whitman on probation for a 
period of four years. (4/05/10Tr., p.18, L.9-p.19, L.12; R., pp.122-129.) 
Whitman timely appeals. (R., pp. 134-137.) 
1 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
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ISSUES 
Whitman states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Whitman's 
motion to suppress evidence found during a warrantless 
search of his vehicle? 
2. Is the United States Supreme Court's recent holding in Davis 
v. United States fatal to Mr. Whitman's Gant argument? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 




Whitman Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
Whitman argues on appeal that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to dismiss "when it held that an exception to the Gant rule applied and 
that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered." (Appellant's brief, 
p.6.) Whitman's arguments fail. Application of the correct legal standards to the 
facts demonstrates the district court correctly concluded Whitman was not 
entitled to suppression. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers 
to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free 
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards 
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-
6, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306, 309 
(2004). 
C. Whitman Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying 
His Motion To Suppress 
The Fourth Amendment2 prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 
"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain 
2As conceded in his brief on appeal, \lVhitman has never invoked the Idaho 
Constitution as grounds for suppression. (Appellant's brief, pp.2-3, n.2). 
Whitman has therefore failed to claim on appeal that the Idaho Constitution 
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special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. 
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 
479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).) A search incident to arrest is a well 
established exception to the warrant requirement and, as such, does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); 
Kerlev, 134 Idaho at 87 4, 11 P. 3d at 493. Likewise, the automobile exception is 
a well-established exception to the warrant requirement. Colorado v. Bannister, 
449 U.S. 1, 3 (1980); State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 800, 964 P.2d 660, 667 
(1998). 
In Gant, the United States Supreme Court rejected the "bright line" rule of 
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), and adopted the following legal 
standard applicable to the search of a passenger compartment incident to arrest: 
"Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the 
arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of 
the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the 
offense of arrest." Gant, 556 U.S. at 351. Whitman argues that the search of the 
car was unconstitutional because, he asserts, neither Gant exception applies 
since he was not in reaching distance of the car nor was he under arrest when 
the search was conducted. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-9.) Although it appears that 
the search in this case does not qualify under the standard set forth in Gant, 
provides broader or different rights than the Fourth Amendment. See State v. 
Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130, 982 P.2d 961, 965 (Ct. App. 1999). Only the 
Fourth Amendment is at issue on this appeal. State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 
512-513, 236 P.3d 1269, 1272-1273 (2010). 
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Whitman has failed to show error in the district court's holding for three reasons. 
First, the search was proper under the automobile exception because the police 
had probable cause to believe there would be evidence of a crime in the car at 
the time they conducted the search. Second, the district court had sufficient 
evidence before it for this Court to find the search of Whitman's vehicle was 
proper based on the officers' reasonable articulable suspicion that Whitman was 
armed or dangerous. Finally, application of the exclusionary rule under the 
Fourth Amendment is not proper because the police reasonably relied on the 
state of the law existing at the time of the search and therefore the search was in 
good faith. 
1. Because The Officers Had Probable Cause To Believe There Was 
Evidence Of A Crime In The Car, The Automobile Exception 
Justified The Search 
The "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement allows the police to 
search a vehicle without a warrant when there is probable cause to believe the 
vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132 (1925); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979); State v. Buti, 
131 Idaho 793,964 P.2d 660 (1998); State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93,625 
P.2d 1093, 1096 (1981 ). The analysis of whether an officer had probable cause 
for an automobile search is whether, based on the objective facts, a magistrate 
would have issued a warrant under similar circumstances. State v. Murphy, 129 
Idaho 861, 864, 934 P.2d 34, 37 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 
121, 123, 795 P.2d 15, 17 (Ct. App. 1990). Determining the existence of 
probable cause is "a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the 
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circumstances ... , there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found .... " Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Probable 
cause does not require an actual showing of criminal activity, but only the 
"probability or substantial chance" of such activity. ~ at 244-45 n.13. A 
practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all 
that is required. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983); United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). The facts known to the officers must be 
judged in accordance with "the factual and practical considerations of everyday 
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Brinegar 
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). "If there is probable cause to believe 
a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, United States v. Ross authorizes 
a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found." Gant, 
556 U.S. at 347 (citation omitted). 
Here, the district court concluded based on the evidence presented at the 
hearing on the motion to suppress that the police had "observed objective and 
articulable evidence that [Whitman] had a concealed weapon in the vehicle" 
based on "the presence of the ammunition," Whitman's "inclinations to make 
false representations, and the outstanding warrant and accompanying warning 
that the passenger might be a risk when apprehended." (R., pp.99-102; see 
7/20/09 Tr., p.15, Ls.11-20 (testimony of Officer Sterling that finding a bullet in 
the course of a traffic stop would raise concern of a weapon), p.30, L.21 - p.31, 4 
(testimony of Trooper Bailey that "[i]t provided me with a concern that there was 
a firearm in their immediate control or possession").) Based on the totality of the 
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circumstances and the objective facts presented to the officers, probable cause 
existed to believe that evidence of a crime, possession of a concealed weapon, 
would be found in Whitman's car. 
Whitman cites to People v. Colyer, 941 N. E.2d 4 79 (Ill. Ct. App. 2010) for 
his assertion that the existence of a bullet alone is insufficient probable cause to 
search a vehicle for the presence of a concealed weapon. (Appellant's brief, 
p.8.) Whitman is correct that in Colyer, the Illinois Appellate Court did determine 
"probable cause to believe that a weapon was present in the defendant's car did 
not exist based on the information the officer's had a the time of the search of the 
defendant's car" where the only information they had was the observation of a 
bullet in the center console. 941 N.E.2d 479, 486-87. However, here Trooper 
Bailey was acting with much more than merely the observation of a bullet in the 
console. He also had the driver of the vehicle changing, a person with confirmed 
felony warrants with warnings hiding in the back of the vehicle, and the driver 
lying to him about the occupants of the vehicle. (see 7/20/09 Tr., 22, L.3 - p.27, 
L.14.) As the court held in State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 601, 237 P.3d 
1222, 1227 (Ct. App. 2010) it is not necessary that a court find a specific crime in 
upholding a finding of probable cause for a search: 
Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances and the 
objective facts presented to the officers, probable cause existed to 
believe that evidence of a crime would be found in Newman's 
vehicle. Newman argues that, at the time of the search, the officers 
were not presented with sufficient information to support a finding 
that Newman had intended to commit a particular crime. However, 
in order to establish that probable cause existed to search 
Newman's vehicle, the state was not required to show that the 
officers knew whether the purpose of luring the victim to the park 
was to commit the crime of battery, assault, theft by trick, rape, 
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kidnapping, murder, robbery, or any number of other possible 
crimes. All that was required was a showing that probable cause 
existed to believe that evidence of criminal activity would be found 
in the vehicle. 
Here, the officers had sufficient probable cause to believe that evidence of 
criminal activity would be located in a search of Whitman's vehicle. 
Because the facts support a finding of probable cause to believe that 
evidence of criminal activity would be found in the car at the time of the search, 
the search of the car was justified by the automobile exception. Whitman has 
therefore failed to show that the search of the car violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights against unreasonable searches or seizures. 
2. The Search Of Whitman's Car Was Proper Based On The Officers' 
Reasonable Articulable Suspicion That Whitman Was Armed Or 
Dangerous 
The evidence before the district court established that the officers on 
scene had a reasonable basis to believe that Whitman was armed or dangerous 
and, as such, the search of Whitman's vehicle was valid pursuant to the officer 
safety exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, even if this Court determines 
that the search of Whitman's car was not a valid search pursuant to the 
automobile exception, the district court's order denying Whitman's motion to 
suppress must nevertheless be affirmed on this alternative basis. See, ~. 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999); State v. 
Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997) (where the lower court 
reaches the correct result by a different theory, the appellate court will affirm the 
order on the correct theory). 
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Officer safety is always a legitimate concern during a traffic stop. As the 
Court of Appeals noted: 
Concern for officer safety during routine traffic stops has been 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court as being "both 
legitimate and weighty." This is because the "possibility of a violent 
encounter stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist 
stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of 
a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop." 
State v. Johnson, 137 Idaho 656, 661, 51 P.3d 1112 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), and Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 
408 (1997)). 
During a stop based upon reasonable suspicion, an officer may conduct a 
reasonable search for weapons where there is reason to believe that the officer 
is dealing with an armed and dangerous person. "The officer need not be 
absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably 
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety 
or that of others was in danger." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). An officer 
may also make a cursory search for weapons of the interior of a car under the 
same standards as would justify a Terry frisk of an individual. Michigan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032 (1983); State v. Muir, 116 Idaho 565, 567, 777 P.2d 1238, 1239 
(Ct. App. 1989). Those standards are whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances, an officer has a reasonable belief that the person "may be armed 
and presently dangerous." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 
930, 933, 829 P .2d 520, 523 (1992); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 
P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The Court in Long emphasized that such a 
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search may be undertaken even where the suspect is detained outside of the 
vehicle: 
Just as a Terry suspect on the street may, despite being under the 
brief control of a police officer, reach into his clothing and retrieve a 
weapon, so might a Terry suspect in Long's position break away 
from police control and retrieve a weapon from his automobile. In 
addition, if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be 
permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have access to 
any weapons inside ... in any event, we stress that a Terry 
investigation, such as the one that occurred here, involves a police 
investigation "at close range," when the officer remains particularly 
vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not been 
effected, and the officer must make a "quick decision as to how to 
protect himself and others from possible danger . " 
463 U.S. at 1051-52 (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court in 
Gant noted the continued relevancy of such searches: 
Other established exceptions to the warrant requirement authorize 
a vehicle search under additional circumstances when safety or 
evidentiary concerns demand. For instance, Michigan v. Long 
permits an officer to search a vehicle's passenger compartment 
when he has reasonable suspicion that an individual, whether or 
not the arrestee, is "dangerous" and might access the vehicle to 
"gain immediate control of weapons." 
Gant, 556 U.S. at 347 (citations omitted). 
So long as "an officer can point to specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant a frisk for 
weapons, then such a frisk will not violate the Fourth Amendment." State v. 
Hughes, 134 Idaho 811, 813, 10 P.3d 760, 762 (Ct. App. 2000). In this case, the 
initial officer testified of his concern upon observing the bullet in the console: 
Q: Okay. Were you concerned about your safety at that point in 
the investigation? 
A: Yes, I was. 
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Q: And why were you concerned? 
A: I was concerned because I believed [Whitman] was lying to 
me. I didn't know the totality as far as what criminal things were 
going on, but their behavior was definitely consistent with people 
involved in criminal activity and trying to conceal stuff from me the 
police officer. 
Q: Did your observation of a bullet provide you with any 
additional concerns? 
A: It provided me with a concern that there was a firearm in 
their immediate control of possession. 
Q: And based on your training and experience where you have 
a traffic stop, is that a highly dangerous situation? 
A: Yes, it is. 
(7/20/09 Tr., p.30, L.11 - p.31, L.4 (testimony of Trooper Bailey).) The officer 
called to back up Trooper Bailey had concerns that a bullet might lead to the 
presence of a weapon as well. (7 /20/09 Tr., p.15, Ls.11-20 (testimony of Officer 
Sterling).) 
Based on the totality of the circumstances present in this case, it was 
reasonable for Trooper Bailey to determine, as Whitman was exiting the vehicle 
upon his directive, that Whitman or his passenger Maddox were armed and 
dangerous, thus justifying a search of his vehicle for weapons. The state 
therefore requests this Court to affirm the district court's order on this alternative 
basis. 
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3. Because The Police Acted In Good Faith Reliance On Existing 
Case Law, Exclusion Of The Evidence Under The Fourth 
Amendment Is Improper 
Even if the search of the car was not justified pursuant to the automobile 
exception, Whitman would still not be entitled to suppression of evidence under 
the Fourth Amendment. 
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the United States Supreme 
Court addressed whether suppression of evidence is appropriate where the 
police rely upon a facially valid warrant. The Court first noted that its precedents 
did not require exclusion of evidence as a remedy for all Fourth Amendment 
violations. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-06, citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 
(1976). Nor is suppression a right guaranteed to the individual, but is rather a 
judicially created remedy crafted for its deterrent effect. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, 
citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
The Court further stated that exclusion of evidence is a remedy that exacts 
"substantial social costs" as it impedes the truth finding processes of the judicial 
system, which often results in the guilty going free or receiving reduced 
sentences. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907. When applied to actions of law enforcement 
taken in good faith or where the violation was minor, "the magnitude of the 
benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the 
criminal justice system" and can generate disrespect for the law and the 
administration of justice. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08. Thus, the exclusionary rule 
should be applied only '"where its remedial objectives are thought most 
efficaciously served."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 910, quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. 
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Assuming that the exclusionary rule ever has the desired effect of discouraging 
misconduct, "it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter 
objectively reasonable law enforcement activity." Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-19. 
Application of the exclusionary rule "'necessarily assumes that the police 
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has 
deprived the defendant of some right."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, (quoting Michigan 
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974).) Once an officer has obtained a warrant, 
there is nothing more the officer can do to comply with the law and, therefore, 
"[p]enalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot 
logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations." Leon, 
468 U.S. at 921. Thus, the Court held, "the marginal or nonexistent benefits 
produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on 
a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of 
exclusion." Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. Rather, exclusion of evidence obtained by 
the execution of an invalid search warrant is only appropriate where the 
magistrate was misled by information the affiant knew was false or provided in 
reckless disregard for its truth; where the issuing magistrate "wholly abandoned 
his judicial role"; where probable cause was so lacking that "official belief in its 
existence [was] entirely unreasonable"; or where the warrant was so facially 
deficient that the executing officers could not reasonably presume that it was 
valid. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23. 
Leon's "good faith" analysis has been applied by the Court in other 
contexts as well. In Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 4 (1995), Evans was arrested 
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on an outstanding warrant and his car searched incident to his arrest. It was 
later learned that the arrest warrant had been quashed 17 days previously, but 
the court failed to notify law enforcement, so the warrant still showed as valid in 
computer records. Id. at 4-5. Concluding that the officer's conduct was 
reasonable, and the error was committed by court employees who would not be 
deterred from improper conduct by suppression of evidence, the Court concluded 
that suppression was not warranted under the Fourth Amendment. kl at 14-16. 
Recently the Court decided Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137-
38 (2009), in which Herring had been arrested on the basis of an arrest warrant 
that appeared in computer records maintained by law enforcement in a different 
county, but a search of the actual records after arrest showed the warrant had 
been recalled. The Court held that suppression of evidence of illegal possession 
of a conti;plled substance and a firearm was not required because the police 
conduct did not rise to the level of "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent 
conduct, or ... recurring or systemic negligence." kl at 144. Suppression is not 
called for, the Court held, when the police mistakes are the result of simple 
negligence rather than systemic errors or reckless disregard of constitutional 
requirements. kl at 146-7. 
In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 342-44 (1987), a police officer inspected 
the yard and records of a licensed dealer in automotive parts and scrap pursuant 
to an Illinois statute allowing such searches, and ultimately arrested three people 
for possession of stolen cars. The Illinois statute in question was struck down as 
unconstitutional by a federal court the day after the search. kl at 344. Applying 
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the reasoning of Leon, the Court concluded that the error in that case was the 
Illinois legislature's act of passing an unconstitutional statute, and that there 
would be no deterrent effect to be gained by suppression. kl at 349-53. The 
Court held that the officer's reliance on the statute was objectively reasonable; 
therefore the exclusionary rule did not apply. kl at 356-60. 
The analysis of these cases applies in this one. The police in this case 
acted entirely reasonably under the law as it existed at the time. As found by the 
district court, Whitman was "placed in the patrol vehicle while the officers 
searched [his] vehicle incident to arrest." (R., p. 96.) The legality of the search 
incident to arrest was well established at that time. State v. Heer, 118 Idaho 98, 
99,794 P.2d 1154, 1155 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 
454 (1981 ), and finding search of car incident to defendant's arrest for DUI 
constitutionally reasonable). It was not unreasonable for the police to fail to 
anticipate that the Supreme Court of the United States would, approximately four 
months after the search, alter the applicable legal standards. 
Because the police conduct was done in reasonable reliance on existing 
law, and in no way the product of "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent 
conduct, or ... recurring or systemic negligence," Herring, 555 U.S. at 144, the 
exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment does not apply. See State v. 
Frederick, 149 Idaho 509,236 P.3d 1269 (2010). 
The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Davis v. United 
States, _ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2429 (2011) supports this position in 
holding that "[e]vidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable 
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reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule." As the 
Court in Davis explains, 
About all that exclusion would deter in this case is 
conscientious police work. Responsible law-enforcement officers 
will take care to learn "what is required of them" under Fourth 
Amendment precedent and will conform their conduct to these 
rules. But by the same token, when binding appellate precedent 
specifically authorizes a particular police practice, well-trained 
officers will and should use that tool to fulfill their crime-detection 
and public-safety responsibilities. An officer who conducts a search 
in reliance on binding appellate precedent does no more than '"ac[t] 
as a reasonable officer would and should act"' under the 
circumstances. The deterrent effect of exclusion in such a case 
can only be to discourage the officer from "'do[ing] his duty."' 
That is not the kind of deterrence the exclusionary rule seeks 
to foster. We have stated before, and we reaffirm today, that the 
harsh sanction of exclusion "should not be applied to deter 
objectively reasonable law enforcement activity."' 
Davis,_ U.S._, 131 S.Ct. at 2429 (internal citations omitted). 
Whitman asserts Davis is not "fatal to [his] Gant argument" because in his 
case, "the trooper never explicitly testified as to the legal justification for his 
search, let alone cite to Belton or its progeny as the basis for his search." 
(Appellant's brief, p.11.) Whitman points to this failure of the officer to cite to 
relevant case law to support the basis for his search as the reason "Davis can be 
distinguished from the facts of [his] case." (Appellant's brief, p.11.) This 
argument is without merit. The Court in Davis looked at reasonable police 
reliance on binding precedent as the basis for determining that evidence 
obtained in such a situation is not subject to the exclusionary rule. Davis, _ 
U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. at 2429. There is no requirement that the officer cite to the 
cases they relied on in conducting a search. Trooper Bailey testified that 
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although he had not made any "confirmed decisions" prior to the search of the 
vehicle as to what Whitman would be cited or arrested for, Whitman was secured 
in a patrol vehicle and Trooper Bailey believed Whitman "had severely obstructed 
[him] during [his] initial contact with the vehicle. [Whitman] was obviously being -
was lying to [him] as far as who was in the vehicle, [and] possible guns in the 
vehicle." (7/20/09 Tr., p.29, L.8 - p.30, L.B.) 
Further, there is no requirement that the search of the vehicle be 
conducted prior to a formal arrest. Recently, the Court of Appeals addressed this 
issue and concluded there "is no reason to treat the search of a vehicle incident 
to arrest differently from a search of a person incident to arrest with regard to the 
timing of the formal arrest." State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115, _, 266 P.3d 1220, 
1224 (Ct. App. 2011 ). Therefore, as long as the "search and the arrest are 
substantially contemporaneous, and the fruits of the search are not required to 
establish probable cause for the arrest, the search need not precisely follow the 
arrest in order to be incident to that arrest." ~ 
Because Whitman's arrest was substantially contemporaneous to the 
search and because the fruits of the search were not required to establish 
probable cause to arrest Whitman for resisting or obstructing, and because the 
officers reasonably relied on Gant in searching Whitman's vehicle incident to 
arrest, Whitman has failed to establish a Fourth Amendment violation. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying Whitman's motion to suppress. 
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